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The language of categories is affectionately known as “abstract nonsense,” so
named by Norman Steenrod. This term is essentially accurate and not necessarily
derogatory: categories refer to “nonsense” in the sense that they are all about the
“structure,” and not about the “meaning,” of what they represent.
Paolo Aluffi (1960-Current)
Algebra: Chapter 0
1 Introduction
Category theory has proven to be an extremely useful tool in understanding current deep questions in math-
ematics. To a mathematician, category theory allows one to organize mathematical experience and “think
bigger thoughts.”1 To a philosopher, category theory offers a fresh perspective on structuralist foundations to
mathematics and a well developed alternative to the focus on set theoretic constructions, like the traditional
type theory of Russel and Whitehead.
The recent trend in mathematics is towards a framework of abstract mathematical objects, rather than
the more concrete approach of explicitly defining elements which objects were thought to consist of. A
natural question to raise is whether this sort of abstract approach advocated for by Lawvere, among others,
is foundational in the sense that it provides a unified, universal, system of first order axioms in which we can
define the usual mathematical objects and prove their usual properties. In this way, we view the “foundation”
as something without any necessary justification or starting point. Some of the main arguments for categories
as such a structure are laid out by MacLane as he argues that the set-theoretic constructions are inappropriate
for current mathematics as practices, and that they are inadequate to properly encompass category theory
itself and therefore cannot properly encompass all of mathematics, while category theory can be used to
describe set theory and all the natural consequences of a given primitive system.∗
Others view this issue quite differently as a matter between understanding organization verses foun-
dations of a mathematical theory. Kreisel argues that the category theory is, at its heart, concerned with
efficiency and is therefore an organizational system, while set theory maintains its true role as arbiter of
validity and is therefore a foundational system.
In this paper, we begin by describing the two basic elements of category theory; the category, a collection
of objects and arrows, and the functor, a mapping between categories. From there we develop the theory
of the closed Cartesian category and the adjoint relation. This construction is at the core of Lawvere’s
categorical logic and is also the source of much criticism by more “traditional” logicians, like Kreisel and
Halpern. We will explore these criticisms as well as the relationship between these theories and work
towards an argument for the importance of category theory as a foundational tool in mathematics.
∗We will generally refer to a ZFC system unless otherwise specified.
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2 Construction of Category Theory
This section is meant to provide the un-initiated an overview of the key results of category theory in relation
to mathematical logic and provide the terminology for much of the rest of the paper. Specific definitions are
not overly important, but it is essential to get a flavor for the structures that will play a role in categorical
logic.
2.1 Categories
A category, at its core, is a collection of objects and directional relationships between them. A collection
itself is a mathematical object that contains other mathematical objects. Its relationship to a “set” is not
specified a priori, although in most applications it will effectively function as such.
Definition 1. A category C consists of the following:
• A collection O(C) of objects which are denoted by A, B, C, etc.
• A collection A(C) of arrows which are denoted by f , g, h, etc.
• Two unique mappings dom, cod : A(C) → O(C) which assign to each arrow of A(C) its domain,
dom( f ), and codomain, cod( f ), which are objects in O(C). In general we have
f : cod( f ) → dom( f )
We can also define the hom-set denoted C(A, B) such that
C(A, B) := { f ∈ A(C)| f : A → B}.
• For any triple of objects A, B, C, there exists a composition map
CA,B,C : C(A, B) × C(B,C) → C(A,C)
This is equivalent to saying for any map, f , from A to B and any map, g, from B to C, there exists a
composition map, g ◦ f from A to C.
• For any object, A, in O(C) there exists an identity arrow denoted idA : A → A.
• For any f : A → B and two other arrows g and h we have that
idB ◦ f = f = f ◦ idA,
h ◦ (g ◦ f ) = (h ◦ g) ◦ f .
2.2 Diagrams
The structure of O(C) and A(C) can be easily seen in diagrammatic form. These diagrams show the various
associative and identity properties explicity by following the arrows between objects. Say we have a category
with the objects A, B, and C, and functions defined as f : A → B, g : B → C, and h : A → C, we can
express this category as
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AB C
hf
g
idB
idA
idC
In general, we won’t include the identity maps in order to have a more presentable diagram
A
B C
hf
g
Nothing prevents us from having the same object or arrow appear multiple times in a diagrammatic
description. The property that idB ◦ f = f = f ◦ idA can be shown by noting that the following diagram is
commutative or path independent
A A
B B
idA
f f
f
idB
so that all possible routes from A to B are equivalent (i.e. f = idB ◦ f = f ◦ idA). We can similarly show
associativity with this commutative diagram
A B
C D
f
g ◦ f
g
h ◦ g
h
We can also have diagrams based around a square, as in this diagram
A B
DC
f
h g
k
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where commuting would mean that g◦ f = k◦h. It is important to note that a diagram doesn’t necessarily
have to commute unless forced to by the properties of a category (as with the associativity and identity
diagrams). Also note that arrows are not in general reversible within a given category.
Definition 2. An isomorphism in a category C is an arrow i : A → B such that there exists an inverse arrow
i−1 : B → A and
i−1 ◦ i = idA , i ◦ i−1 = idB.
If such an arrow exists, we say that A and B are isomorphic, A  B.
There are also a few specific definitions to categorize possible objects that could exist within a given cat-
egory. These become important later on as we define special categories which will be applied to foundational
logical issues.
Definition 3. An object I in a category C is initial if, for every object A ∈ O(C), there exists a unique arrow,
iA from I to A.
Definition 4. An object T in a category C is terminal if, for every object A ∈ O(C), there exists a unique
arrow, tA from A to T .
Proposition 1. If, in category C, there exists two initial elements, I and I′, then there exists a unique
isomorphism, τ : I → I′.
2.3 Products
The concept of a product is very natural as one looks to see the relations between objects. In traditional set
theory, a common construction is a multivariable truth function which takes two objects from a set of all
possible statements and maps them to either 0 or 1 depending on whether they are mutually exclusive or not.
Recall the basic definition in set theory as
Definition 5. The Cartesian product of a set is defined as
A × B := {(a, b)|a ∈ A ∧ b ∈ B}
and the set of projection functions as
χ1 : (a, b) → a, χ2 : (a, b) → b.
This can easily be generalize in a categorical context. Remember that we still don’t assume that there
is any structure within the objects, and all the arrows are without any connotation of being mappings of
individual elements.
Definition 6. Let A,B be objects in O(C). The object A × B along with the pair of arrows χ1 : A × B → A,
χ2 : A × B → B such that for every triple A, B, C, with arrows f : C → A, g : C → B there exists a unique
arrow
〈 f , g〉 : C → A × B
where we have the following diagram commuting
A A × B B
C
χ1 χ2
f g
〈 f , g〉
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so that χ1 ◦ 〈 f , g〉 = f and χ2 ◦ 〈 f , g〉 = g.
In order to help solidify these concepts, it is useful to look at a concrete example of a category, the
category of sets. An important thing to note when looking at the category of sets is that we are only looking
at objects and the arrows between them, and not any sort of structure within the objects. In particular, we do
not make mention of elements of the sets except in the context of the functions themselves.2
Example 1. The category of sets, set, is a category where all objects A ∈ O(set) are sets, and all arrows f
are defined as total functions between those sets.
• Composition of arrows is defined as the normal composition of functions where g ◦ f (a) = g( f (a)).
• The identity map idA : A → A is defined as idA(a) = a.
• Two objects, A and B, are isomorphic if all the arrow relations are the same for both sets.
• The null set, ∅, is an initial object since one can define a function from ∅ to an arbitrary set (simply
a function without any mappings), but one cannot define a function from a set with elements to the
empty set since for a given element there is no object in ∅ to relate it to.
• Similarly, singletons (i.e. sets with only one element) are terminal objects as the only function one can
construct is that mapping all elements of some set to the single object. All single sets are isomorphic,
as one can simply rename the functions by the single object in the set.
2.4 Functors
Functors involve two categories, a domain category A, and a codomain category B, and a mapping which
assigns every arrow in A to one in B in a fashion that preserved the commutative properties of a diagram.
More formally we have that
Definition 7. A (covariant) functor map F : C → D is determined by the following
• An object map, assigning an object FA ∈ O(D) for every A ∈ O(D).
• An arrow map, assigning an arrow F f ∈ A(D) for every f : A → B in A(D) such that
F(g ◦ f ) = Fg ◦ F f FidA = idFA
There is no reason to believe that a functor need be bijective (i.e. that each FA is unique and every
element T ∈ O(D) has a corresponding B ∈ O(C)). In fact, the simplest functor to understand is the
constant functor, FC , which maps all objects in a given category to a single object in another category, and
all arrows to the identity arrow. Another simple functor is the identity functor which maps all objects to
themselves and all arrows to themselves, producing an identical category.
A particularly useful construction in the product functor which is symbolized −×Y . This functor maps
all objects X ∈ O(C) to X × Y , and all arrows f to 〈 f , idY〉. Diagrammatically this can be expressed as
A
B C
hf
g
A × Y
B × Y C × Y
〈h, idY 〉
〈 f , idY〉
〈g, idY 〉
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2.5 Natural Transformations
One of the immediate results of the definition of functors is that one can create a category of categories,
denoted cat, where all of the objects are categories and all the arrows are functors between them. A level
up in abstraction, we can also define a category of functors as objects, and natural transformations as the
arrows in the category.
Definition 8. Let F and G be functors C → D. A natural transformation, t, is defined as a directional
relation from F to G, and is indexed by objects in C,
tA : FA → GA
or, more schematically,
t : F → G.
If f is an arrow from A to B in category C we have the following commuting diagram.
FA FB
GBGA
F f
tA tB
G f
The natural transformations between functors between two given categories are the arrows within the
functor category or category exponential. For fixed categories A and B, this construction is denoted BA.
It can be shown that this object satisfies some nice properties, such as if t ∈ A(BA) and u ∈ A(CB) then
t ◦ u ∈ A(CA). A useful specific example is the self exponential AA, which essentially describes the structure
of the space of endomorphisms (self-mappings).
2.6 Adjoint
The property of adjunction plays a crucial role in Lawvere’s theories and in the universality of category
theory. At its core, adjunction is a duality relationship between functors that satisfies some particular useful
and natural properties.
Definition 9. An adjoint situation involves categories (A and B), two functors (F : A → B and G : B → A),
and two natural transformations (t : A → FG ∈ A(AA) and u : GF → B ∈ A(BB)) such that the following
two relations hold,
tF ◦ Fu = F, Gt ◦ uG = G.
F and G are said to adjoint to one another. Adjoint situations are sometimes listed by their functors and
natural transformations as 〈G, F, t, u〉.
It can be shown3 that adjoint situations have some important properties.
• Adjoints are unique, in that given any two adjoint situations with a given functor F, the adjoint functors
G and G′ will be isomorphic.
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• Given two fixed categories A and B in two adjoint situations, any natural transformation v : F → F′
induces a unique natural transformation w : G → G′.
• Similarly adjoint situations can be composed and remain adjoint. If one has two adjoint situations ,
〈G, F, t, u〉 between A and B and 〈G′, F′, t′, u′〉 between B and C, one can construct
F′ ◦ F : A ← C
which left adjoint to
G ◦ G′ : A → C.
2.7 Cartesian Closed Categories
Cartesian closed categories have additional structure imposed on the relationship of arrows within the cate-
gory and the existence of exponential objects. They have found widespread applications in logic, not only
in the context of categorical constructions of Tarski’s theorem, but also in formulations of lambda-calculus4
and theoretical computer science more generally.∗
Definition 10. A closed Cartesian category is category C which satisfies the following properties:†
• Any two objects, A, B ∈ O(C), have a product A × B ∈ O(C).
• Any two objects, A, B ∈ O(C), have a exponential BA ∈ O(C)
• There exists a terminal object, denoted 1.
The category set is cartesian closed since the product set is just the cartesian product of two sets (a set)
and the exponential, BA is the set of all functions from A to B, which is also a set.5
3 Category Theory vs. Set Theory
In considering the foundations of mathematics, the most common approach has been couched in terms of
a set-theoretic axiomatization of the “member relationship”. It is a remarkable empirical fact that all of
modern mathematics can be placed within some formulation of set theory (although different concepts may
need different set theoretic formulations). To be more precise, all mathematical objects can be considered
sets through a hierarchical structure, and all the crucial properties of such sets can be derived from the
axioms of a set theory.6 It seems perfectly plausible that one could look just as easily at axiomatization of
the notion of a “function” as opposed to a set.‡ The categorical notion of arrow is merely an extension of
the notion of a function to simply be a directional relationship, with any associated structure additional for
that particular case (such as for Set).
A natural criticism of category theory is that it doesn’t provide a true divergence from the line of set
theoretical constructions. Tarski himself asked at a conference, “But what is a category if not a set of objects
together with a set of morphisms?” Lawvere reply stressed that foundational set theory is based on the
binary relationship of membership, while category theory is based on a ternary relationship of composition
(i.e. commutativity of diagrams). Category theory in this way focuses on structure, while set theory focuses
∗Often-times Lawvere’s work refers to a topos, which is a Cartesian closed category with additional substructure conditions.
We will limit our discussion to just Cartesian closed categories.
†Lawvere defined closed Cartesian categories in terms of the adjoint relationships within them which result in the listed proper-
ties.
‡An axiomatized fuctional formulation is important in λ-calculus, for example.
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on identity. A single object of category theory is effectively meaningless, while a single set in set theory has
its own inherit meaning through concepts of membership, cardinality, etc. Relations between objects are
how structure emerges in category theory; specifically one identifies a codomain of a given arrow, thereby
allowing to explicitly differentiate between an inclusion map and an identity map (i.e. set theory doesn’t
distinguish fully between f : R → R and f : R → N).
3.1 Set Theoretic Approach to Category Theory
The question still remains what is (or if there exists) the appropriate set theoretical foundation category
theory. There are three commonly suggested answers to this question; Grothendieck Universes, reflection
principles, or none whatsoever. Grothendieck universes are perhaps the most natural of these to study
category theory as they provide an exact list of properties that keep the sets (and therefore categories)
“small”, in such a way to avoid the failings of naive set theory.
Definition 11. A Grothendieck universe is a set U with the following properties
• If x, y ∈ U then {x, y} ∈ U.
• if x ∈ U and y ∈ x then y ∈ U.
• If x ∈ U then the power set of x is also in U.
• if the exists a family of sets, {xa}a∈I , within U, and if I ∈ U then the union of all xa is also an element
of U.
This approach to construction has some immediate drawbacks. It implies the existence of an inaccessible
cardinal, k, and all mathematics are formed before stage k (i.e. in the process of taking unions of sets). One
cannot construct a category of categories, which is a fairly natural process in category theory and other
“large” sets. We also have to extend beyond standard ZF(C) constructions to establish this inaccessible
cardinal.∗
Reflection principle has a similar hierarchical structure but attempts to avoid the issues of inaccessible
cardinals by saying that the universe of small sets is simply an elementary substructure of the universe of
all sets. More precisely, we have that each first-order statement within the theory of small sets has the
same meaning when the variables range over all sets. With this in mind, we only need to prove categorical
theorems within the small-set structure and then “reflect” that result to all sets. We also need not extend
beyond ZF(C) set theory to construct the basic relations to be reflected.7
The effort to develop category theory entirely without the structure of sets is very much a goal of those
who view category theory as a “better” foundation to mathematics or, at least, a useful tool distinct from
set theory. The primary promotor of this view is Saunders MacLane, the cofounder of category theory,
who formulated the concept of a metacategory entirely within a first order system without any concept of
“set” built in.8 He avoids the use of the concept of a set of objects and the terminology associated with it,
instead focusing purely on relational aspects between objects. According to him, there are two fundemental
concepts of category theory that standard ZF set theory cannot describe; (i) One cannot form a category of
all structures of a given kind (i.e. category of sets, category of categories) due to self referential paradoxes,
and (ii) one cannot form the exponential category BA of any two given categories, but doesn’t himself offer
a consistent way to construct these objects without resorting to some set-theoretic notion of size.
Utilizing the concept of a fibration (a fundamentally leveled structure), others have attempted to find
a new way within category theory to define size to avoid self-referential paradoxes.9 It is not surprising
that the reliance of most set-theoretical foundational constructions on a constructed hierarchy of cumulative
types might also be found in a the construction of foundational theories utilizing categories.
∗The restricted environment that Grothendieck Universes are constructed is often known as ZF+.
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3.2 Categorical Approach to Set Theory
There have been various attempts to construct axiomatized set theory through a more structured version of
a cartesian Closed category with a “truth object” incorporated in it. Through various possible arrows to the
truth object, it has been suggested that one can construct any possible axioms for a set theory implicitly.10
It has also been shown that very fundamental theorems generally stated through set theory, such as
Tarski’s Undefinability Theorem and Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems, as well as statement of paradoxes,
can be cast completely within the framework of category theory as a natural consequence of the Fixed Point
Theorem which limits possible arrows between objects in a closed Cartesian category.11 This common
structure between seemingly disjoint paradoxes and theorems suggests that there could be deep insight
found in category theory when viewed as a tool in mathematical foundations and a simple extension of
category theory to set theory.12
More contentiously, one can simply view a category as a form of a generalized set. This is perhaps a
natural assumption to make, as Set is suggested to simply be one of many possible categories. If there is
success in constructing category theory of such large categories without resorting to set-theoretical notions
then set theory has no particular priority within the framework of mathematics beyond possible psycho-
logical implications concerning the primacy of the elemental notions of set theory. However, so far, many
logicians seem unconvinced of the ability of category theory to establish the notion of size within itself. The
table below presents the objects in set theory as possible restricted objects in category theory.
Category Theory vs. Set Theory
Object Set
Morphism Function
Monomorphism One-to-one function
Epimorphism Surjection
Isomorphism Bijection
Product Cartesian product
Coproduct Disjoint union
4 Universal Constructions
Category theory provides an extremely useful framework to relate different mathematical concepts. Al-
though originally developed in the context of algebraic topology, various objects constructed in category
theoretic terminology (such as cartesian products, power sets, universal covering spaces, Stone-Cech com-
pactification, etc.) can easily be applied to other fields of mathematics. The concepts of universal con-
structions and the relationships between them within seemingly different fields, has lead to many innovative
proofs for otherwise complex theorems in algebraic topology and algebraic geometry. In this way, universal
constructions allow one to focus on underlying structure as opposed to complicated technical aspects of a
given field.
The most commonly exploited aspect of category theory is the general usefulness of an adjoint oper-
ators. The uniqueness results mentioned in the previous section have extremely important implications in
constructing given mappings within various settings. For example, one can see through universal structures
that free groups, universal enveloping algebras and Stone-Cech compactifications are all simply the left
adjoint of a functor.13
Category Theory’s role as a universal construction is one of the foundational points of Kreisel’s objection
to viewing category theory as a “foundational tool.” He distinguishes between the concept of a foundational
structure and an organizational structure. A foundational structure (in his view, axiomatized set theory) has
to be “as specific as possible” in order to “make strong assertions.” Foundations should be expected to create
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structures that do not occur in practice, like type theory of sets, while practical application in the proofs of
everyday mathematicians do not require distinction in this regards. Universal constructions are an example
of a less-specific construction which doesn’t play a role in foundational specified constructions. In this way
they are useful for practice of mathematics and increasing the “efficiency of proofs”, not in the “analysis
of proofs.” Throughout his discussion, he sees foundational (set theory) being fundamentally distinct from
organizational (category theory).14
However, I view this distinction, particularly in regards to category theory and set theory’s role in the
foundational mathematics as misguided. Throughout mathematics one has essentially two dual aspects; the
Formal and the Notional. In basic algebra, we have a distinction between the manipulation of a polynomial
function and the visualization of the resulting graphical curve. We have the set of theorems that govern a
class of mathematical objects and then we have the analysis of the specific objects in question. In these
cases we see that the Notional is the subject matter of the Formal. In the same way, when one considers
foundational mathematics there could exist a similar, unexplored, relationship between sets and categories.
Although each can provide insight to one another, set theory has a formal component as explicitly defining
its constructions, while category theory is more notional in its search for generic structures. To say that one
is more foundational than the other ignores the mutual dependancies which are being developed.
5 Conclusion
Beauty is the first test: there is no permanent place in the world for ugly
mathematics.
Godfrey H. Hardy (1877-1947)
A Mathematician’s Apology
When considering the foundations of mathematics, it is clearly difficult to fully reconcile category theory
and set theory. While much work has been done to axiomize category theory to such an extent that it can
stand on its own, in practice one still needs to introduce the concepts of size from a given set theoretic
standpoint. On the other hand, set theory seems incomplete in fully grasping nuances of category theory
and it is unable to make relations between objects in mathematics as explicitly clear as category theory.
Although there are no notable “proofs” that category theory establishes that a given axiomatization of set
theory cannot, category theory has shown itself to be able to expose fundamental properties more so than
any other mathematical sub-field. Until category theory is able to fully encompass set theory, it would seem
remise to ignore either when considering fundamental questions at the core of mathematical inquiry.
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